As pressure mounts for an independent inquiry into intelligence on Iraq, The Australian has confirmed key aspects of what the country's spy agencies told the Government in the weeks before war.

Australian spy agencies were significantly more cautious than their US and British counterparts, but still made the key mistake of overestimating Iraq's WMD capability.

Of the two Australian agencies providing intelligence assessments on Iraq, the Defence Intelligence Organisation was more sceptical about Iraq's capabilities than was the Prime Minister's assessment agency, the Office of National Assessments.

The Australian understands that both the DIO and ONA told the Government that:

• Iraq had the capability, personnel and know-how to produce chemical and biological weapons within weeks.
  
  
• There was no proof they were building such weapons and conflicting evidence about their intention to do so.
  
  
• Iraq had WMDs left over from the Gulf War but their numbers were likely to be limited and in poor condition.
  
  
• Intelligence on Iraq was far from comprehensive and it was difficult to reach definitive conclusions, especially on the key question of the size, scope and danger posed by its WMDs.
  
  
• Iraq was unlikely to be passing WMDs on to terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda.
  
  
• It was impossible to verify Baghdad's claims to have destroyed all of its WMDs.

In several instances, senior government ministers echoed public claims made by US President George W.Bush and his British counterpart Tony Blair about Iraq's WMDs before Australian agencies had a chance to assess the claims independently.

However, it is understood that Australian agencies did not caution against such comments, before or after they were made.

As one source said: "We may need to be more proactive next time."

A parliamentary joint committee examining the intelligence received on Iraq is due to release its findings on March 1.

It is expected to distribute blame across the spectrum, criticising Australian agencies for overestimating the WMD threat.

The Government is also expected to be criticised, but will not be accused of deliberately misrepresenting - or "sexing up" - the intelligence available to it.

Labor is calling for a larger independent inquiry on intelligence with the powers of a royal commission.

The Government is expected to call a broader inquiry into intelligence on Iraq shortly after the parliamentary report is tabled.

The push for a broader inquiry reflects concerns that the parliamentary committee was not given enough time or access to key intelligence to make conclusive findings.

The Australian understands that committee members were given access to the classified final ONA and DIO analysis on Iraq in the lead-up to war.

But they were not given access to the raw material upon which those assessments were based, for fear that sources might be compromised.

The committee was, however, able to compare and contrast the final ONA and DIO assessments with the public comments made by John Howard and his senior ministers in the lead-up to war.